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SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE EXPERT 
WITNESS 
JOSEPH SANDERS* 
[S]cientific inquiry is by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist; it focuses on the 
general law or principle rather than the particular case; its core values are intellectual 
honesty and willingness to share evidence . . . . So it is hardly surprising that the legal 
system has had trouble handling scientific testimony, for the legal culture could hardly 
be more different: adversarial; focused on the specific case; formally procedurally 
anchored; valuing promptness and finality . . . .1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The theme for the Spring 2007 SKAPP (Scientific Knowledge and Public 
Policy) conference in New Hampshire was “Conventions in Science and Law.” 
For me, the central issue was how legal conventions and scientific conventions 
differ, and, insofar as they do differ, what impact this has on the behavior of 
individuals at the interface of law and science.2 This article addresses one aspect 
of that question: how these conventions affect the behavior of expert witnesses 
when they appear in court in both civil and criminal cases. Expert witnessing is 
a particularly useful place to observe the clash of legal and scientific 
conventions because it is here that one group of people (scientific experts) who 
are integrated into one set of conventions are challenged by the expectations of 
a different set of conventions. 
Section II of this article reviews differences in scientific and legal 
conventions as they apply to expert knowledge. Section III discusses two central 
reasons for these differences: adversarialism and closure. Section IV focuses on 
expert testimony. It indicates how differences in legal and scientific conventions 
caused by adversarialism and the law’s need for closure create role conflicts for 
experts, as well as uncertainty about the level of justification an expert should 
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 1. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 12 (Winter 2009). 
 2. The term “conventions” is not self-explanatory. In this article, the term refers to those 
routinized ways of doing and understanding that are built into a set of institutional arrangements. Some 
of these things are simply procedures. Others have a normative component. My perspective is informed 
and influenced by the “new institutionalism” in sociology. See generally Mark C. Suchman and Lauren 
B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996). 
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have before expressing an opinion in court.3 The article concludes with some 
thoughts about the appropriate accommodation between scientific and legal 
conventions. 
II 
SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE  
A. Scientific Conventions 
What are the conventions surrounding scientific expert knowledge?4 Most 
people who study the “doing of science” would agree that there is no special 
“scientific method” that is different from and better than other ways of 
understanding the world.5 The successes of the natural sciences over the last few 
centuries are not the result of a special way of going about the production of 
knowledge.6 
But methods are a core part of scientific conventions. Each corner of the 
scientific enterprise is chock full of methodological prescriptions. A substantial 
part of having what passes for scientific expertise in a field is an ability to use 
the tools of the trade and an appreciation of the nuances of the methods of 
investigation commonly employed in the discipline. Susan Haack divides these 
aids to understanding into three categories: “helps” to the senses, “helps” to 
reasoning, and “helps” to evidence-sharing and intellectual honesty.7 
Instruments that expand our senses are at the very heart of progress in 
physics, astronomy, chemistry, and biology, as well as in such practical 
disciplines as medicine and engineering. Aids—“helps”—to reasoning are also 
critical. These include mathematics in its many different forms as well as 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs and other investigatory devices 
 
 3. This discussion builds on an earlier paper on expert-witness ethics. Joseph Sanders, Expert 
Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2007). 
 4. This section borrows heavily on articles by Susan Haack and Herbert Kritzer in this issue. See 
Haack, supra note 1; Herbert Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in 
the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (Winter 2009). 
 5. Haack notes, 
[A]ll empirical investigation demands the same epistemic virtues: respect for evidence, care 
and persistence in seeking it out, good judgment in assessing its worth; and that, in a sense, all 
empirical investigation uses the same method—the method of experience and reasoning: 
making an informed conjecture, seeing how it stands up to the available evidence and any 
further evidence you can lay hands on, and then using your judgment whether to drop it, 
modify it, stick with it, or what. What is distinctive about natural-scientific inquiry isn’t that it 
uses a peculiar mode or modes of inference, but the vast range of helps to inquiry scientists 
have developed, many of them—specific instruments, specific kinds of precaution against 
experimental error, specific models and metaphors—local to this or that field or sub-
discipline. 
 SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 
(2003). 
 6. As Percy Bridgman felicitously phrased it: “[T]he scientific method, as far as it is a method, is 
doing one’s damnedest with one’s mind, no holds barred.” Id. at 93. 
 7. Id. at 98. Haack hastens to add that each of these is intertwined with the other two. 
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designed to assist in making causal assertions.8 The third set of aids, aids to 
evidence-sharing and intellectual honesty, includes such things as peer review, 
publication, replication of findings, and other formal and informal devices that 
involve scientists looking over each other’s shoulders. Often this peek over the 
shoulder focuses on the correct use of the first two types of aids—instruments 
and mathematics and experimental design. All of these aids are fallible and 
none guarantees that we will arrive at correct outcomes.9 Collectively, however, 
these conventions are thought to facilitate inquiry over the long term. 
This article focuses on the second and third set of aids: aids to reasoning and 
aids to evidence-sharing and intellectual honesty. The common mathematical 
and logical aids to reasoning are designed to facilitate not simply inquiry, but 
inquiry of a certain type: inquiry into general laws or principles. This does not 
mean that scientists are uninterested in the particular case; many scientists and 
individuals in fields such as engineering that rely on science may devote most of 
their energy to specific situations. But the heroes of science are those who are 
able to put forth explanations in terms of general laws that explain myriad 
particular observations. 
This interest in the general and the generalizable leads to a second 
component of scientific conventions concerning knowledge—the lack of a 
timetable. An inquiry takes as long as it takes and, with respect to many 
questions, the answer experts are most comfortable with is, “We don’t know.” 
“We don’t know” does not necessarily mean that we don’t have a guess. Often 
it means we do not have enough evidence of the kind we find persuasive to 
support a conclusion.10 
Aids to evidence-sharing and intellectual honesty are central components of 
the ethical culture of the scientific enterprise. They are part of what Merton 
described as a “norm of communism”—calls for the sharing of data and results.11 
Peer review and publication are also part of this set of aids. Although these 
 
 8. See generally WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 
(Kathi Prancan ed., 2002). Even the social sciences play an important role in this process when they 
uncover and document the many systematic reasoning errors that result from judgment by heuristics 
and then suggest affirmative steps we might take to minimize such errors. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1065 (2000). 
 9. From the supposed benefits of bleeding to the more recent realization that many ulcers have a 
bacteriological, not a psychological source, it is easy to point to occasions in which we have been led 
astray for lengthy periods of time. 
 10. When a community of investigators says this, it is referring to evidence that is derived from 
application of the aids to reasoning (and the instruments) to which a field of inquiry is committed. 
There may not be a “scientific method” writ large, but there are methods and aids to inquiry to which 
communities of scholars are committed, and evidence derived from these techniques enjoys greater 
warrant in the community than other types of evidence. Over time, these methods may change as new 
ways to collect and observe are created. Methods are, ultimately, simply tools, and a new problem may 
call for new tools. In this sense, methodology is a pragmatic search for what works. However, at any 
given point in time, the ability of an investigator to persuade her peers about some hypothesis without 
the use of these devices and methods is limited. 
 11. ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, 268–70 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
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latter devices may play a small role in detecting intellectual dishonesty, most 
studies that have explored the peer-review process agree that it is better suited 
to evidence-sharing than to ferreting out deception.12 As Kitcher notes, scientific 
communication and cooperation within the scientific community usually are 
based on the risky assumption that scientists can trust one another to tell the 
truth as they understand it.13 Scientists rarely prepare for deception and 
betrayal. Except when specifically warranted by circumstances, attacks that 
imply less than honest communication are out of bounds.14 This is one reason 
the peer-review process often appears to fall short when asked to perform the 
role of assessing the truth of assertions made in a manuscript. Were scientists to 
turn the peer-review process into a search for deception, they would perhaps 
prevent a few cases of scientific fraud, but only at the cost of an enormous 
amount of investigator time and of undermining the scientific culture of trust. 
In the long run, the failure of others to replicate one’s alleged findings may 
act as a counterweight to fabricated results; but in the short run, the culture of 
honesty is the primary bulwark against deception. At the core of this culture are 
norms calling on individuals to be honest with themselves and others about 
what the evidence is, and to adopt what Merton called “a posture of 
disinterestedness.”15 Intellectual honesty and disinterestedness are threatened 
by the pressures that test the commitment to any such norms: reputation, 
money, job security, et cetera. These pressures come from all sides—from 
businesses that fund one’s research, from the need to publish significant results 
in order to obtain future grants, from lawyers prepared to offer substantial 
remuneration to testify in court, and insidiously, from one’s own political and 
social values that cause one to assess evidence somewhat differently when it 
appears to affect those values. What is most noteworthy, perhaps, is not that 
individuals succumb to such pressures, but that so often they do not, a fact that 
is a testament to the internalization of this scientific convention. 
How then should we summarize the conventions of expert (scientific) 
knowledge? Four components are particularly relevant to this discussion. 
Scientific conventions involve: (1) searching for the general and theoretical, (2) 
employing the methods and techniques accepted by one’s field, (3) an attitude 
of agnosticism that encourages waiting for persuasive evidence before making 
up one’s mind, and (4) a commitment to sharing data, intellectual honesty, and 
disinterestedness. How do these stack up against legal conventions concerning 
expert knowledge? 
 
 12. Effie J. Chan, The “Brave New World” of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, 
and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 100 (1995); Susan Haack, Peer Review and Publication: 
Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789, 789 (2007). 
 13. PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, 
OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 394 (1993). 
 14. Stephen Fuchs & Steven Ward, What is Deconstruction and Where and When Does it Take 
Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 481, 489 (1994). 
 15. MERTON, supra note 11, at 275. 
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B. Legal Conventions 
In his article in this symposium, Professor Kritzer notes that legal 
conventions differ from scientific conventions in at least three ways relevant to 
the preceding discussion: differences in data sources, differences in mindset 
toward drawing conclusions, and differences in the approach to evidence.16 A 
word about each of these is in order. 
If scientific conventions focus on systematic and general knowledge, legal 
inquiry, at least in the context of most trials, focuses on experience and specific 
events. To be sure, law is often concerned with general questions, such as, 
“Does drug X cause injury to Y?” However, law is nearly always also concerned 
with what happened to a specific person at a particular point in time. 
The second difference is what Professor Kritzer calls mindset. He quotes a 
comment from an engineer who had never appeared in court before, concerning 
one of his first preparation sessions with a trial attorney named Bill: 
Bill asked me a question about whether the belt was on or not, the lap belt. And I said, 
“Well, could have been. But then, it may not have been.” Woo, rockets went off. 
“What do you mean? You’re my expert in this case, and you say it ‘could be’ or 
‘couldn’t be?’ Look, I’m going to tell you. The other side doesn’t waffle. They pick 
one view. And they will push that view. And they will make their case in front of a 
jury. And there will be no misunderstanding. There will be no gray area. They will 
take a position one way or the other and make it stick. Now, they don’t have any other 
course of action. That’s their life. They make their living going in front of juries and 
making statements, whether they have facts to back them up or not. Now you, you can 
go back to designing cars. You have another career. They don’t. You better start 
thinking like they do.17 
In this passage, the expert’s initial position reflects the scientific convention 
that values caution and a “wait and see” attitude. It runs headlong into the legal 
convention that pushes the witness to make a decision and to do so with a 
reasonable degree of certainty.18 
The legal preference for certainty is related to a third difference. Expert 
knowledge in law is a partisan resource. Each party gets to choose which 
experts to present and to shape its presentation in the way that puts the party’s 
 
 16. Professor Kritzer poses the issue as one of persuasion. Kritzer, supra note 4, at 41. 
 17. FRED PRICHARD, EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES: AN INSIDE VIEW 30–31(2005), quoted in Kritzer, 
supra note 4, at 53–54. 
 18. I say “reasonable degree” because too much certainty—that is, absolute, inflexible belief in 
every fact that supports a party’s position and rejection of every fact that does not—is very likely to 
backfire for the witness who expresses such views. The person will be perceived as simply a hired gun 
who has no commitment to the truth. Experts report pressures for greater certainty in other studies as 
well. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Daniel Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An Empirical Examination 
of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 385 (1991) [hereinafter 
Champagne, Shuman & Whitaker, Expert Witnesses] (reporting that fifty-six percent of the experts they 
interviewed say their lawyers ask them to be less tentative). They found a similar percentage (fifty-
seven percent) in a second, follow-up study. Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony 
Champagne, An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three 
City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 (1994) [hereinafter Shuman, Whitaker & Champagne, Expert 
Witnesses Part II]. Perhaps more alarmingly, twelve percent of the experts in the first study and twenty-
two percent in the second study agreed with the statement that lawyers try to get their experts to testify 
to issues for which there is no scientific basis. 
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case in the best possible light. There is no obligation to take a critical, 
disinterested look at all the evidence and, as Kritzer notes, it is part of the 
partisan nature of the process that an advocate is expected to do everything 
possible to cast doubt on opposing testimony, even when the advocate knows 
that the testimony is accurate.19 It goes without saying that this approach is 
contrary to scientific conventions of data sharing, intellectual honesty, and 
disinterestedness. 
Professors Kritzer and Haack are quick to observe that this distinction 
describes an ideal. On the one hand, scientists are not always disinterested. 
They often become advocates for their preferred hypothesis or theory. 
Moreover, all of us, scientists included, are prone to what psychologists call 
confirmation bias.20 On the other hand, the legal system places limits on 
partisanship. Witnesses are sworn to tell the “whole truth.” But if it is important 
to avoid the trap of a false dichotomy, it is equally important to eschew an 
attitude that science and law are the same. There are real differences. The norm 
among scientists is to take a critical approach to evidence. That norm is not 
always followed. But it is different from the legal arena where the norm is to 
adopt a partisan approach to evidence. 
III 
REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO EXPERT KNOWLEDGE 
Two factors explain much of the difference in legal and scientific approaches 
to expert knowledge. They are the U.S. adversarial system and a legal system’s 
need for prompt closure. Understanding how each of these factors influences 
legal conventions is necessary if we are to find an appropriate accommodation 
when science enters the courtroom. 
A. Adversarialism 
One source of differences between legal and scientific conventions is the 
U.S. legal system’s commitment to adversarial processes—most importantly, the 
partisan use of expert knowledge. Adversarial processes are a part of a larger 
commitment to what Robert Kagan terms “adversarial legalism.”21 Oscar Chase 
focuses on four components that define U.S. adversarial processes: (1) the civil 
jury, (2) the use of party-controlled pretrial investigation, (3) the relatively 
passive role of the judge at the trial or hearing, and (4) the method of obtaining 
and using expert opinions (that is, parties hire and prepare experts).22 Note that 
three of these components—party-controlled, pretrial investigation, passive 
 
 19. Kritzer, supra note 4, at 50 n.46. 
 20. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998) (defining confirmation bias as “the seeking or interpreting 
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis at hand”). 
 21. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001). 
 22. Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
277, 287 (2002). 
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judiciary, and party selection and employment of experts—are directly tied to 
the idea that expert knowledge is a partisan resource. Moreover, the features 
interact with each other to heighten the overall level of adversarialism. Party 
control of pretrial investigations and a relatively passive judiciary both enhance 
the effect of the party selection of witnesses. 
Professor Chase speaks of these four components as the essential procedural 
elements that define what he calls “American exceptionalism.”23 The point is 
that among western legal systems, this constellation of features is nearly unique 
to the United States. European legal systems and legal systems from other 
developed countries, such as Japan, that have borrowed from European systems 
do not share these elements. Those systems are much more inquisitorial. 
Among other things, this means the judiciary plays a much larger role in pretrial 
investigations and in trial proceedings. For example, Professor Chase notes that 
German judges have a statutory “duty” to clarify issues; this often involves 
asking questions designed to mark out areas of agreement and disagreement 
and thus inevitably weaken party control of the evidence.24 Most importantly, 
experts are retained by the court, not the parties.25 In most of the world, the 
judge, not the parties, controls the selection and examination of experts.26 
Although a commitment to adversarial procedures is an important source of 
differences between legal and scientific conventions concerning evidence, one 
should not lose sight of the fact that this commitment is an incidental feature of 
a legal system.27 To claim that our strong commitment to adversarial procedures 
is an incidental feature may sound heretical to a large portion of the U.S. legal 
community that has little knowledge or interest in other legal systems and 
whose members have been steeped in adversarial ideology since law school. 
From a wider international perspective, however, our commitment to the party 
selection of experts is unusual and, judging by the operation of other legal 
systems, unnecessary. 
 
 23. Professor Chase’s point is not that no other countries have any of these elements, but that this 
set of all four factors distinguishes U.S. trial practice from that of most other countries. The difference 
is especially pronounced on the civil side, in which relatively few other countries employ juries. It is less 
pronounced on the criminal side. For a recent example of a work comparing the use of experts in civil 
litigation in the United States and other counties, see ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU & 
LUIS EDUARDO SPROVIERI, PRACTICAL GLOBAL TORT LITIGATION: UNITED STATES, GERMANY 
AND ARGENTINA. 83–97 (2007). 
 24. Id. at 297. 
 25. Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses in Europe and America, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS 
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 235, 235–
44 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003). 
 26. Chase, supra note 22, at 300; see also MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 78 
(1997). 
 27. To say that something is incidental does not mean that it is easily changed. Many members of 
the U.S. legal profession support the present arrangement with almost religious zeal. See MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS (1990); Monroe H. Freedman, Our 
Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57 (1998). 
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B. Closure 
The second source of differences in legal and scientific conventions is the 
law’s need for closure. Both science and law deal with controversy, and both, 
therefore, must be concerned with how controversies come to an end. The end 
of a controversy may be influenced by both epistemic and nonepistemic factors. 
Epistemic factors are those that people involved in the controversy regard as 
knowledge-based and therefore internal to the very understanding of the 
problem. Nonepistemic factors are those factors external to the undertaking of 
the issue as an endeavor of rational, empirical investigation.28 
Controversies may conclude in a number of ways. Two types of closure are 
particularly relevant to this discussion: closure by way of resolution and by way 
of termination.29 A controversy is resolved when agreement is reached on the 
merits of the case. The factors involved are necessarily epistemic. Termination 
occurs when nonepistemic factors, such as an authoritative ruling by some 
official agency, brings an end to a controversy. These two types of closure are 
not mutually exclusive. Closure is often accomplished by a combination of these 
processes. However, both empirically and normatively, different arenas assign 
different weights to methods of closure. The conventions of science value 
resolution as a proper way to resolve questions. And in one sense, science lives 
up to this idea. Closure without substantial resolution is very rare in science. As 
Professor Haack notes, 
We describe disagreements among proponents of rival scientific theories or historical 
claims as ‘debates’; and participants in such controversies sometimes engage in 
something that looks a lot like advocacy. Moreover, eloquence and appeals to 
authority sometimes produce artificial consensus, at least temporarily. But 
disagreements among inquirers, unlike debates between rival advocates, cannot be 
decided by a vote on the basis of rival presentations; they will settle on a conclusion 
only if and when the evidence brings the community of inquirers to a genuine, 
unforced, consensus.30 
 
 28. H. Tristram Engelhardt & Arthur L. Caplan, Patterns of Controversy and Closure: The 
Interplay of Knowledge, Values and Political Forces, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES 1, 5 (H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. & Arthur L. Caplan eds., 1987). 
 29. Ernan McMullin, Scientific Controversy and its Termination, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES, 
supra note 28, at 49, 77–82; see Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1031–35 (1997). A third way controversies may end is abandonment; no way may 
be found to resolve an issue and people lose interest. 
 30. Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J. 
JURIS. 43, 47 (2004). A notable recent example of an attempt to end a scientific debate by an appeal to 
authority was the thirty-year dominance of the views of Soviet agronomist T.D. Lysenko. With the help 
of the repressive powers of the state, first under Stalin and later under Khrushchev, Lysenko was able 
to suppress all controversy between his views and those of classical genetics. McMullin, supra note 29, 
at 80. Of course, with the passing of the repressive apparatus of the state, the artificial “consensus” 
quickly evaporated. 
  Even in the absence of a repressive political regime, resolution is rarely complete and other, 
nonepistemic factors often play a role. People clinging to an increasingly minority position may find it 
difficult to obtain grants to do research or to gain access to the leading journals to publish their 
findings. For a discussion of ways in which termination strategies were used to bring about an end to 
research and controversy concerning the drug Bendectin, see JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON 
TRIAL 86-88 (1998). 
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The problem with resolution as a strategy to end controversies is that it is 
open-ended. Science’s commitment to resolution produces the attitude of 
agnosticism that values doubt and encourages waiting for persuasive evidence 
before making up one’s mind. Given that a central objective of courts is to bring 
controversies to an end in reasonably prompt fashion, it is not surprising that 
the legal system is rarely willing to wait for an issue to be resolved before 
concluding litigation. Instead, courts usually rely on termination, that is, an 
authoritative ruling by the court, to bring an end to a controversy. 
This does not mean that courts are indifferent to achieving the factually 
(and legally) correct outcome. They would prefer to get it right, and thus 
resolution is a goal, but one to be achieved within the boundaries of the court’s 
obligation to resolve disputes in a timely fashion. Reopening a case that has 
been decided is a rare phenomenon.31 
The tortured history of Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.32 
provides an instructive example that reveals the tension between timely 
termination and proper resolution. In February 1982, the parents of Mary 
Oxendine filed a suit in her name in the District of Columbia Superior Court, 
claiming that her limb-reduction birth defect was caused by the drug Bendectin, 
which her mother had taken to control morning sickness while pregnant with 
Mary.33 The trial lasted a month and resulted in a $750,000 verdict for the 
plaintiff, with a punitive-damages trial scheduled to follow.34 Following the trial, 
the judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) in favor of 
the defendant.35 
In 1986, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the trial-
court j.n.o.v. ruling was an abuse of discretion and ordered the trial court to 
reinstate the verdict.36 When the case was remanded to the trial court, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that one of the 
plaintiff’s experts had testified falsely at trial.37 After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial judge agreed and granted the motion in February 1988.38 Plaintiff appealed, 
and in 1989 the Court of Appeals again reversed, ruling that the trial judge had 
erred in granting a new trial.39 Once again, it ordered the trial court to reinstate 
 
 31. Reopening cases is particularly problematic in a system that relies on jury trials. Largely 
because of the central place of juries in our civil justice system, U.S. trials are concentrated events in 
which all the evidence is presented at one time. Systems without juries are more likely to have episodic 
trials and less need for a final determination at a certain point in the process. Moreover, the substantial 
expense involved in mobilizing for a new trial argues against upsetting jury verdicts in the absence of 
plain and significant error. For a discussion of the concentrated trial in the United States, see 
DAMAŠKA, supra note 26, at 58–73. 
 32. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986). 
 33. Id. at 1103. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1114. 
 37. Id. 
 38. The original trial judge recused himself subsequent to the reversal, and this order came from a 
new judge. 
 39. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 563 A.2d 330, 332 (D.C. App. 1989). 
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the original verdict.40 The defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which 
was denied in 1990.41 
However, when the case was returned to the trial court and the plaintiff 
asked the trial judge to enter a judgment on the verdict, the defendant again 
appealed. In 1991 the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the 
judge could not enter an enforceable and appealable “final judgment” on the 
$750,000 compensatory damage award until the completion of the punitive 
damage phase of the trial which, due to the many appeals, had never taken 
place.42 Faced with this ruling, the plaintiff abandoned her punitive damage 
claim and, in the summer of 1993, moved for summary affirmance of the 
compensatory damage claim.43 
At this point, the defendant asked the trial judge to reconsider the original 
jury verdict in light of post-trial scientific developments.44 The trial judge 
refused to do so and entered a judgment on the 1982 verdict. The defendant 
again appealed and in 1994, twelve years after the jury verdict, the appellate 
court held that the trial court had erred in flatly refusing to consider post-trial 
evidence regarding the drug’s safety—although relief could be granted only if 
the defendant manufacturer could demonstrate that newly discovered evidence 
would probably produce a different verdict if a new trial were granted.45 Two 
years later, in the fall of 1996, the trial court entered an order granting the 
defendant a judgment as a matter of law.46 The order was accompanied by an 
opinion that reviewed nearly all of the scientific data published from 1983 to 
1996 and concluded that the plaintiff could not produce admissible evidence 
that Bendectin is a teratogen.47 Apparently, the plaintiff never appealed this 
ruling, effectively bringing an end to the litigation. 
A number of things could be said about this lengthy proceeding, but for 
purposes of this article three points are central. First, at the end of the 
proceedings, when it would have been relatively easy for the Court of Appeals 
to simply permit the case to be terminated in the way the jury had decided 
many years before, it chose to compel the trial court to reconsider the scientific 
evidence. It was interested in what the scientific community thought, especially 
if that community had come close to resolving the underlying factual issue of 
whether Bendectin is a teratogen. Clearly, it had.48 Second, even here, the 
 
 40. Id. at 338. 
 41. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 563 A.2d 330, 332 (D.C. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 1121 (1990). 
 42. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Oxendine, 593 A.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. App. 1991). 
 43. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 827 (D.C. App. 1994). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., No. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992, at *33 (D.C. Super. Oct. 
24, 1996). 
 47. Id. at *34. A teratogen is any substance that interferes with fetal development, thereby causing 
birth defects. 
 48. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 83–86 (1998). Even when a case is properly resolved 
from the point of view of outsiders, the losing litigant may not agree. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
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willingness of the Court of Appeals to permit the trial court to take a second 
look would have been very unlikely if there had been a final termination of the 
litigation. Absent proof of some serious wrongdoing by the prevailing party, 
undoing a final judgment in a civil matter is extremely rare.49 The defendant’s 
most remarkable achievement in the Oxendine litigation was not its ultimate 
victory, but its relentless effort to prevent a final judgment in the litigation. 
Finally, even though the courts did not formally undo a final judgment, 
Oxendine’s Jarndyce v. Jarndyce-like longevity may strike many as unseemly. 
Courts should not let cases linger in this way. The prompt termination of 
disputes is itself an important goal. 
In sum, closure is a more fundamental issue than adversarialism. Unless we 
are prepared to craft a tort system that is indifferent to questions of causation, 
the law’s need for relatively prompt closure stands in direct conflict with the 
scientific convention that closure should only occur when a consensus forms, 
however long that might be. Moreover, closure requires the fact finder to 
address specific questions concerning the parties before it, questions that 
scientists may be relatively less prepared to answer. 
IV 
ADVERSARIALISM, CLOSURE AND EXPERT WITNESSES 
Given these reasons for the differences between legal and scientific 
conventions, how do they affect our understanding of expert witnessing? The 
question can be divided into two parts: the role the expert should assume and 
the justification an expert should require before making an assertion. 
A. Role 
From the point of view of many experts, the most troublesome aspect of 
expert witnessing is balancing the scientific conventions of data-sharing, 
intellectual honesty, and disinterestedness with legal conventions that treat 
expert knowledge as a partisan resource. This, ultimately, translates into a 
question of the expert’s proper role. One vision is of the expert as an educator.50 
 
legal systems devote so much energy to questions of procedure. For it is through procedural correctness 
that courts hope to assuage the losers. If evidence is what permits the resolution of disputes to most 
everyone’s satisfaction, procedure is what permits the termination of disputes to most everyone’s 
satisfaction. Over the last twenty years, a large body of research on procedural justice confirms that 
lawsuit losers are much more likely to accept an adverse outcome if they believe they received 
procedural justice. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 49. The situation is somewhat different on the criminal side. In recent years many convicted felons 
have been exonerated through DNA testing. See Susan Haack, Inquiry and Advocacy, Fallibilism and 
Finality: Culture and Inference in Science and the Law, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 205 (2003); Seth 
F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction 
DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547 (2002); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for 
Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 
(2004). 
 50. See MELVIN A. SHIFFMAN, Code of Professional and Ethical Conduct, in ETHICS IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE AND MEDICINE: GUIDELINES FOR THE FORENSIC EXPERT AND THE ATTORNEY, 280, 283 
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The expert is someone who conveys the knowledge of her field in a way that 
permits the fact finder to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the 
parties’ arguments. A different vision is the expert as part of the team that hired 
her, a party’s advocate.51 The tension between the two is something felt by many 
experts. The following comment is typical: 
I always experience a certain amount of tension in the process of testifying. The 
conflict is between whether I am testifying for the people who hired me or whether I 
am a servant of the court, and am simply supposed to answer questions and however 
the questions come up, the answers fall where they will.52 
Note that this tension is not between the ideal expressed in scientific 
conventions and the ideal embodied in the law. The legal ideal is identical to the 
scientific convention. It conceives of the expert witness as a source of 
independent and disinterested information.53 The expert is a witness, not an 
advocate, and as a witness the expert takes the typical oath promising to tell 
“the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” This is a promise not 
only not to lie, but not to engage in half-truths and withheld truths.54 It is the 
legal system’s commitment to adversarialism in the form of party control of 
expert witnesses that creates substantial pressures on experts to adopt a more 
party-oriented point of view. 
What evidence we have suggests that adversarial procedures do indeed take 
their toll. Indeed, in one survey of experts, seventy-seven percent agreed with 
the statement that lawyers manipulate their experts to weaken unfavorable 
testimony and to strengthen favorable testimony, and fifty-seven percent agree 
that lawyers urge their experts to be less tentative.55 Judges, too, complain about 
expert-witness bias. In the same study, the authors report that 
[s]eventy-nine percent of the judges did not think expert witnesses could be depended 
upon to be impartial. . . . Sixty-three percent thought that expert witnesses were 
 
(Melvin Shiffman ed., 1999) (“A forensic expert assumes the added role of a teacher. Members are 
required to maintain competence in both their expertise and in an ability to clearly and accurately 
disseminate that expertise to others.”). 
 51. See Joanna A. Albers et al., Toward a Model Expert Witness Act: An Examination of the Use of 
Expert Witnesses and a Proposal for Reform, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1269 (1995). The preamble to the model 
statute drafted by a group of University of Iowa law students begins with the following sentence: “This 
[Act] is designed to change the role of an expert witness from advocate to educator.” Id. at 1276 
(brackets in original). 
 52. MARK CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION CASES 112 (1988). 
 53. Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 467 
(1999); Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 911 
(1999–2000). This position is made explicit in the civil-procedure rules of the United Kingdom. Rule 
35.3 states: “(1) It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters within his expertise. (2) This 
duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is 
paid.” CIV. P.R. 35.3, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part35. 
htm#rule35_1. 
 54. 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 3.10 (2007–2008 ed.); see also Lubet, supra note 53, at 467 (“The single most 
important obligation of an expert witness is to approach every question with independence and 
objectivity.”). 
 55. Shuman, Whitaker & Champagne, Expert Witnesses Part II, supra note 18, at 201. 
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usually noticeably biased in favor of the side paying them, and sixty-eight percent 
thought that the most distressing characteristic of expert witnesses was that they could 
not be depended upon to be impartial. Fifty-seven percent reported that they thought 
of expert witnesses as ‘hired guns’ who gave biased testimony. Sixty-eight percent of 
the judges feared that some of the fees experts charged were large enough to provide a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case.56 
Other studies report similar results. When federal judges are asked about 
problems they encounter with expert testimony, the most-frequently mentioned 
problem is that experts abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side 
that hired them.57 
Jurors also may perceive bias. A National Law Journal poll in 1992 found 
that over thirty percent of jurors in civil cases reported the experts were 
biased.58 Not surprisingly, some feel that this is a low number. One experienced 
litigator who thought the percentage would be higher observed, “It means we 
have a lot of good actors as experts.”59 Or it may mean that jurors, who do not 
see multiple cases, as do judges, may be less sensitive to bias. 
Bias, or at least the perception of bias, is an inevitable part of a system in 
which experts are chosen by the parties. A limited body of psychological 
literature suggests that adopting a role affects attention to details, memory 
retrieval, and decision thresholds.60 Some research on witnesses confirms this 
effect. In one study, Shepard and Vidmar conducted an experiment in which 
undergraduates viewed a slide show and heard an audio tape depicting a fight.61 
The “witnesses” then were interviewed by either an adversary or a 
nonadversary lawyer and a week later testified about what they saw.62 Witnesses 
interviewed by the adversary lawyer biased their testimony in favor of the 
lawyer’s client, and this bias affected impressions of the factual evidence and 
responsibility judgments of “naive” adjudicators—those unaware of who had 
interviewed the witness.63 
Several studies of accountants affirm this result. Bazerman and colleagues 
have explored what they call a “self-serving bias.”64 They gave undergraduate 
and business students a complex set of information about a potential sale of a 
fictional company and asked them to estimate its value. The subjects were 
assigned different roles—buyer, seller, buyer’s auditor, and seller’s auditor. 
 
 56. Id. at 202–03. 
 57. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert 
Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328 (2002). 
 58. Jeffery Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls, and 
Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 255 (2001). 
 59. Id. 
 60. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic 
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2002). 
 61. Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: 
Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980). 
 62. Id. at 320. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Max H. Bazerman, George Lowenstein & Don A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad 
Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 97 (2002). 
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Most relevant for purposes of showing that expert bias is a byproduct of an 
adversarial system is the comparison of those subjects asked to play the two 
auditor roles. Their valuations were biased in their client’s favor in both a 
public statement about the company’s worth and in private communication to 
their client. At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to estimate 
the company’s “true value” and were told that they would be rewarded 
according to how close their private judgments were to those of impartial 
experts. Even with this incentive, subjects asked to play the role of the buyer’s 
auditor produced estimates that were on average thirty percent higher than the 
estimates of the subjects asked to play the role of the seller’s auditor.65 
The subjects in a second study by these authors were professional auditors.66 
Each of the 139 subjects was given five ambiguous auditing vignettes and asked 
to judge the accounting for each. Half the subjects were asked to suppose that 
they had been hired by the company they were auditing and half were asked to 
suppose they were hired by a different company doing business with the 
company in question. They were then asked to state whether or not the firm’s 
financial reports complied with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). For all five vignettes, the auditors were on average thirty percent 
more likely to find that the accounting behind the company’s financial report 
complied with GAAP if they were playing the role of auditor for the firm.67 
One must be careful in drawing conclusions from studies that are so 
different from the actual expert-witnessing experience. However, the results do 
suggest that very weak role manipulations can produce biasing effects even 
among witnesses who themselves have no psychological or economic interest in 
a given outcome. In general, these studies suggest that experts are more likely 
to come to the stand with “hot biases.”68 Such biases are not necessarily 
intentional, but they are directionally motivated. The experts are more likely to 
want a certain outcome to prevail.69 
Party control over the selection of experts produces bias not only by pushing 
experts to a more one-sided view than the individual expert might express if 
 
 65. Id. at 100. 
 66. Id. at 100–01. 
 67. Id.; see also Bazerman et al., supra note 64, at 97; Lawrence A. Ponemon, The Objectivity of 
Accountants’ Litigation Support Judgments, 70 ACCT. REV. 467, 484 (1995) (noting that when 
accountants act in a litigation-support role, despite a professional responsibility to act objectively, they 
favor their clients’ economic interests and will provide a higher estimate of an inventory destroyed by 
fire if hired by the plaintiff and a lower estimate if hired by the defendant). 
 68. Some biases are intentional, such as those that are the result of fraud or advocacy. Other biases 
may be thought of as “hot.” They are often unintentional and even unconscious, but they are 
directionally motivated because the individual expects or wants an outcome to prevail. Still other biases 
are “cold.” They occur even in the absence of a desire for a certain outcome and in spite of a desire to 
achieve accuracy. Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, in 49 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 268 (Janet T. Spence et al. eds., 1998). 
 69. See D. Michael Risinger et al., supra note 60, at 90. These results would come as no surprise to 
early twentieth-century commentators on expert witnesses. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The 
Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 59 (2000) (quoting a number of passages to 
this effect, including one from Wigmore in the 1923 edition of his evidence treatise). 
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placed in a different role; it produces bias in the selection process itself. 
Witnesses are chosen because they prefer a point of view, and the very choice of 
experts clouds the degree of consensus that may surround a topic. Other aspects 
of the adversarial trial produce similar effects. As Jasanoff notes, 
Adversarial process is indeed a wonderful instrument for deconstructing “facts,” for 
exposing contingencies and hidden assumptions that underlie scientific claims, and 
thereby preventing an uncritical acceptance of alleged truths. The adversary process is 
much less effective, however, in reconstructing the communally held beliefs that 
reasonably pass for truth in science. Cross-examination, in particular, unduly 
privileges skepticism over consensus. It skews the picture of science that is presented 
to the legal factfinder and creates an impression of conflict even where little or no 
disagreement exists in practice.70 
Given the many shortcomings of the present arrangement, complaints about 
the use of expert witnesses have a long history, beginning shortly after party 
control of experts became the norm,71 and continuing to the present time.72 
These concerns have lead to many proposals designed to lessen the adversarial 
nature of expert testimony. They include expert panels, neutral experts, court-
appointed experts, and science courts. None of the proposals has met with much 
success, although many of them would be an improvement over the status quo. 
A less-adversarial selection of experts would assist juries by giving them a more 
balanced view of the scientific issues at stake. 
These proposals are resisted precisely because they interfere with attorney 
control and, more fundamentally, they challenge adversarial procedures that 
are, as Kessler notes, far more than a legal technique and instead encompass an 
entire political image of justice.73 In light of this ideology, substantial 
movements away from party-witness experts seems unlikely.74 
 
 70. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 
345, 353–54 (1992). 
 71. As early as 1901, Learned Hand wrote his well-known article criticizing party-selected experts. 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
40 (1901). For a general overview of expert witnesses prior to the 1900s, see TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF 
MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA (2004). 
 72. Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present reviews the many 
attempts to establish court-appointed, expert-witness systems in the United States. 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1387, 1394–96 (2006). For example, The Model Expert Witness Act, published in 1937, would have 
improved the fit between fact-oriented experts and the normative tensions of the law. Id. at 1394. 
Under that Act, pretrial conferences between experts would have been held to resolve their factual 
disagreements. Id. Such provisions of the Model Act have never been adopted into law. 
  Somewhat later, Edward Cleary suggested, “It is not only essential to reduce the partisan 
element in the selection of experts, but it is equally important that the contentious character of the 
presentation of the results of the expert’s investigation be modified.” EDWARD W. CLEARY, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 44 (3d ed. 1984). 
 73. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search 
for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1273 (2005); see also KAGAN, supra 
note 21, at 3; Sven Timmerbeil, The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil Litigation, 9 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 163, 163 (2003). 
 74. Professor Easton believes we are stuck with a system of party witnesses testifying in an 
adversary setting. The central idea informing the Easton proposal is that the jury will find it easier to 
make an informed evaluation of the experts’ testimony if each side is required to report all 
communications between hiring attorneys and expert witnesses as well as all of the items considered by 
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However, U.S. courts have taken smaller steps toward reducing the 
untoward effects of the adversarial selection of witnesses. The so-called Daubert 
revolution has pushed courts in the United States toward a slightly more 
inquisitorial posture. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
the 1970s, most states followed the Frye rule.75Although the Frye test could have 
been employed by judges to exert greater control over expert testimony, it was 
often honored in the breach and rarely invoked in civil cases.76 The era of a 
totally passive judiciary slowly ended after the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and, since Daubert, the federal judiciary and the courts in many states 
have adopted a more active, inquisitorial posture in assessing the quality of a 
party’s experts.77 This trend is especially noticeable in mass tort cases that end 
up in multidistrict litigation (MDL) proceedings.78 Often, key causal questions 
are decided in MDL admissibility rulings long before any case is returned to its 
home district for trial.79 
A more proactive judiciary may assist jurors in understanding evidence in 
cases by eliminating from their consideration the least probative evidence.80 It 
does not, however, help experts to resolve the role conflicts that inhere in the 
party selection of witnesses.81 If we are unwilling to move away from party 
selection as the primary method of witness selection, we can at least better arm 
experts to resist efforts by their attorneys to have them adopt a more partisan 
stance. Many professional associations have codes of ethical conduct that call 
 
the experts. If bias cannot be controlled, at least it can be revealed. Moreover, a full disclosure system 
might encourage attorneys to do less to influence expert testimony. Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition 
for the Shoot-out with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert Witness Disclosure, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 465, 474, 608 (2000). 
 75. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). According to the Frye test, scientific 
evidence should be admitted only when the scientific principle upon which the expert’s testimony is 
based is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.” Id. at 1014. 
 76. See Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a 
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
 77. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L. J. 1983 
(1999); Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial 
Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355 (1998). 
 78. Barbara J. Rothstein, Francis E. McGovern & Sarah Jael Dion, A Model Mass Tort: The PPA 
Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 626–27 (2006). 
 79. Occasionally, MDL judges go even further. In the silicone-breast-implant litigation, Judge 
Pointer appointed an expert panel under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. The panel’s finding that 
implants did not cause autoimmune disease played a central role in ending the litigation. See DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 28.2 (2007–2008 ed.). 
 80. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility 
of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003). 
 81. See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and The (Partial) Failure of the 
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 489 (2008) (“The problem with the Daubert revolution, 
then, is not that it was too radical, but that it was not radical enough. Rule 702 attempts to solve the 
problem of adversarial bias through a reliability test, but it leaves intact the general adversarial 
structure that creates the underlying reliability problem.”). 
